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ARTICLES

Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and
Selection Bias In Litigation
Robert H. Gertnert
Since the pathbreaking work of Baxter, 1 and especially since
that of Priest and Klein,2 legal scholars have realized that they
cannot treat a reported appellate case or even a litigated case as
a randomly selected dispute. Many disputes are resolved before a
lawsuit is filed, many cases are settled prior to litigation, many
litigated cases are not appealed, and many appealed cases do not
have reported opinions. So long as the processes of filing suit,
settlement, appeal, and reporting are not random but vary across
characteristics of the dispute, any analysis of litigated or reported cases is subject to "selection bias."
Priest and Klein argue that, given certain restrictive assumptions, each side will win half of the litigated cases under
any legal rule. This is the "50% rule." Subsequent literature has
focused on exploring in more detail the conditions under which
the 50% rule will hold. This literature largely indicates that the
50% rule does not hold in actual settlement negotiations and trial
outcomes.'
' Associate Professor of Business Economics, The University of Chicago Graduate
School of Business.
William F. Baxter, The PoliticalEconomy of Antitrust, in Robert D. Tollison, ed,
The Political Economy of Antitrust: Principal Paper by William Baxter 11 (Lexington,
1980).
2 George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J
Legal Stud 1, 4-5 (1984).
' George L. Priest, Measuring Legal Change, 3 J L Econ & Organization 193, 197,
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There are two basic models in the law and economics literature on dispute settlement. I refer to them as the "optimism
model" and the "asymmetric information model." Almost the
entire literature on selection bias is based on the optimism
model.4 The goal of this paper is to demonstrate the unique
effects that the asymmetric information model has on selection
bias. The distinction between the optimism and asymmetric
information models may be much more important for understanding the way in which litigated cases are unrepresentative than is
the debate which has dominated the literature over the exact
conditions under which the 50% rule holds.
Selection bias has dramatic implications for empirical legal
research. In only rare and special circumstances is detailed data
available on disputes that are settled prior to trial, and even
more rarely on disputes that are settled before a lawsuit is even
filed. 5 Legal scholars therefore must typically rely on the inferences they can make from the small subset of disputes that are
litigated to judgment. However, to analyze whether a change in a
legal rule benefits plaintiffs or defendants, one cannot simply
compare the outcomes of litigated cases under the two regimes.
For example, a rule change that benefits plaintiffs could conceivably benefit defendants in litigated cases if good cases settle
more frequently under the new rule than they did under the old.
Understanding the process by which disputes settle or fail to
settle will help legal scholars unravel the biases created by the
selection effect. They may then "adjust" the data on litigated
cases taking the selection bias for the settlement process into
account, and thus learn more from the existing data.6

206 (1987); Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J Legal Stud 337 (1990); Samuel R. Gross and Kent D.
Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for
Trial, 90 Mich L Rev 319, 322 (1991).
' The one exception is a recent paper by Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information
and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J Legal Stud 187 (1993). I refer to this
paper in section 5.
' There are some notable situations where information on disputes that are not
litigated to judgment is available. One such data set is analyzed in Henry S. Farber and
Michelle J. White, Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the Litigation
Process, 22 Rand J Econ 199, 203-04 (1991); See also James Hughes and Edward Snyder,
Litigation Under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence (1993) (unpublished manuscript).
' The econometrics literature on selection bias demonstrates how knowledge about
the selection process can help one to develop unbiased estimators of underlying relations.
See, for example, James J. Heckman, Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error,47
Econometrica 153 (1979).

Asymmetric Information

Selection bias in litigation is becoming an even more important issue with the growth of alternative dispute resolution.
Comparisons between different dispute resolution devices suffer
from two types of selection bias. First, the two regimes may lead
to different patterns of settlement, so that the higher awards'
may be due to better cases being tried rather than settled. Second, the distribution of disputes that are resolved under different
regimes may itself not be a randomly-selected subset of all cases.
For example, if disputes can only go to arbitration if both parties
agree to arbitration, the mere fact that the parties agree to
arbitration may reflect important underlying characteristics of
the dispute. A more complete understanding of the settlement
process, and the selection biases it generates, will provide guidance in the interpretation of the imperfect data that are available.
A second motivation for this paper is to develop testable
effects of selection bias across the two models of pretrial settlement. One can then take data from the limited situations where
there is good information about pretrial dispute resolution and
compare the implications of the two models to separate the type
of suits that should settle from those that should be litigated.
This can provide important evidence about which of the two competing models fits the actual settlement process.!
One of the most basic questions in legal scholarship, and one
of the defining questions of the law and economics movement, is
whether or not the common law tends toward efficiency.8 The
underlying force that may cause the common law to evolve
toward efficiency is the assumption that disputes in areas where
existing doctrine is inefficient are more likely to be litigated. This
assumption does not have a great deal of theoretical or empirical
justification. A more complete understanding of the process of
settlement can provide insight into the types of situations where
the selection of suits for litigation may conform to those suits
that will or will not induce an evolution to efficiency.
Judicial decision-making also may be affected by selection
bias. A judge only observes disputes that are litigated, so a judge.
may adopt a rule or standard that is "optimal,"9 for the types of

" For an example of a paper attempting to do some of this analysis, see Hughes and
Snyder, Litigation Under the English and American Rules (cited in note 5).
8
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 251-55 (Little, Brown, 4th ed 1992).
9 "Optimal" here does not necessarily mean economically efficient. It merely refers to
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cases that are litigated, but that is not the same rule the judge
would adopt if fully-informed about the set of disputes that are
affected by the rule.
An example may clarify this argument. It is conceivable that
almost all legitimate medical malpractice suits settle prior to
litigation. Prior to trial each side has a complete record of the
patient's medical history. They have each consulted experts and
perhaps taken depositions. If there is a legitimate claim, it is
unlikely that there will be large differences in opinion or information about the outcome at trial. However, it may well be the
case that people who have suffered terribly after medical treatment believe that their doctor has committed malpractice even
when almost any informed, unbiased observer would think otherwise. These cases may be the ones that do not settle. If so, judges
will find themselves presiding over cases where there is much
lower incidence of liability than in the general population of
disputes. Judges may thus create standards that make it quite
difficult for plaintiffs to prevail. Because the standards judges set
in cases that are litigated form the basis for pretrial settlement
of all disputes, the stricter standard will make it more difficult
for a legitimate claim to succeed if it goes to trial, thus reducing
the settlement the plaintiff can extract from the defendant in
pretrial negotiations. This may be sub-optimal in the sense that a
judge who is fully informed about the selection bias would choose
a less strict standard.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that if lawsuits do not settle because the litigants have different information about the outcome at trial, then the selection bias in operation may be qualitatively very different from the selection bias
observed in the optimism model of litigation. I develop a model in
which the plaintiff (herein, the "victim") has private information
about damages and the defendant (herein, the "injurer") has
private information about the likelihood of liability. I show that
in this setting, selection bias results in a distribution of litigated
cases having a lower likelihood of success but higher awards
conditional on success relative to the underlying distribution of
disputes. I explore the empirical implications of the model and
briefly discuss the effects that increased judicial uncertainty on
settlement has on the two different models.

the decision rule which best leads to whatever the judge is trying to achieve.

Asymmetric Information

I. SETTLEMENT AND LITIGATION WHEN BOTH SIDES HAVE THE
SAME BELIEFS
Most civil litigation is a negative-sum game. The outcome is
a transfer, perhaps equal to zero, from the defendant to the
plaintiff. This outcome appears to be zero-sum, but since litigation involves significant costs in legal fees, expert fees, and time,
it becomes more efficient to settle than to litigate. However, although a large fraction of disputes settle without litigation, litigation does happen. There are numerous possible explanations
for why inefficient litigation may occur despite the cost savings
from settlement. Most can be classified as either differences of
opinion between litigants or differences of information between
litigants. 0
I begin with a simple numerical example. A tort victim
claims damages of $100,000. Both parties agree that damages are
indeed $100,000 if the injurer is held liable. Each side would
incur $10,000 in costs to litigate the claim. Assume further that
each side believes that the probability that the victim will prevail
in litigation is 0.8." Thus, the expected recovery net of costs to
the victim is $70,000 [i.e. (0.8*100,000) - 10,000] and the expected payment by the injurer is $90,000 [i.e. (0.8*100,000) + 10,0001.
The defendant is willing to settle for anything less than $90,000
and the plaintiff is willing to settle for anything greater than
$70,000. In the terminology of bargaining theory, there is a
$20,000 agreement zone, from $70,000 to $90,000.
Will the parties reach agreement or litigate? One cannot say
with certainty, but it seems likely that they will avoid litigation.
The defendant may adopt a variety of bargaining postures to
induce the plaintiff to accept an offer close to $70,000, while the
plaintiff may do likewise to induce the defendant to agree to
settlement near $90,000. Nonetheless, since each party is not
fully informed about what the other is willing to accept, posturing probably has limited value and they are likely to reach agreement.1

"0 There are some explanations that do not fit easily into either category. Lawyers,
for example, may have an incentive to advise clients to reject settlement offers or make

low settlement offers if the lawyer can expect to earn more by litigating.
" We further assume that each side knows that the other has the same beliefs about
the outcome of litigation.
12 A large class of models look at the outcome of complete information bargaining
while assuming an explicit sequence of allowable offers and counteroffers. In general,
agreement is reached with little or no inefficiency. See, for example, Ariel Rubinstein,
Perfect Equilibriumin a BargainingModel, 50 Econometrica 97 (1982).
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The two basic models of litigation and settlement assume
that each party is completely informed about its rival's willingness to settle. The failure to reach agreement arises because the
parties have different beliefs about the outcome of litigation.
Before comparing the implications of the optimism and information models for the selection of litigated suits, it is worth mentioning a third reason why a lawsuit may not settle. In some
situations litigation may not be a negative-sum game. If the
plaintiff places great value on a judicial finding against the defendant or if the defendant has a reputation to maintain that
requires that it not admit any wrongdoing, settlement may be
inefficient despite the legal costs associated with litigation. This
may be most important in criminal settings where the defendant
may place a very high value on avoiding any time in jail. Repeat
players such as insurance companies may wish to develop reputations for litigating certain types of cases in order to increase their
bargaining power in future cases, or to deter frivolous suits. A
significant fraction of the cases that are litigated may be of this
type. For the purposes of this paper, I will ignore these effects
and assume that we are in civil litigation settings where both
parties care only about the monetary aspects of the trial. In addition, I assume the parties are risk-neutral."3
II. THE OPTIMISM MODEL

In the optimism model of pre-trial settlement, parties settle
disputes unless each side is sufficiently optimistic about its prospects in litigation that the difference in expected outcomes exceeds the total costs of litigation. Gould, 4 Landes," and
Posner 6 developed the optimism model of settlement and litigation in the early 1970s and it remains the basic model used in
most of the law and economics literature. In this model, each
party has a private belief of what it expects to get in litigation.
Recall our example from the preceding section where both sides
agree that damages are $100,000 and each side has litigation
costs of $10,000. However, now assume that the victim expects to

"' Risk aversion would complicate the models and increase the likelihood of settlement, but would not affect the qualitative nature of the results.
" John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J Legal Stud 279, 284-86
(1973).
William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J L & Econ 61 (1971).
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedureand JudicialAdministration, 2 J L Stud 399, 417 (1973).
"

16
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win with probability 0.9 and the injurer expects the victim to
prevail with probability 0.5. In this case the victim will settle for
no less than $80,0007 and the injurer will offer no more than
$60,000.8 There is no longer any scope for agreement. Litigation
will result since the maximum that the injurer is willing to offer
is less than the minimum the victim is willing to accept.
More generally, parties litigate rather than settle in the
optimism model when they are sufficiently optimistic about the
outcome of litigation. They will not settle if the difference between the net amount the victim expects to receive and the total
amount the injurer expects to pay is greater than the total costs
of litigation. 9 That, in essence, is the basic optimism model of
settlement and litigation.
The central assumption of this model is that the process of
pretrial bargaining does not affect the beliefs of the parties about
the outcome of litigation. In the example above, the victim expects to receive $90,000 in litigation and the injurer expects to
pay $50,000. If the injurer offers only $50,000 to settle the case,
the victim might reasonably think that the injurer knows something about the outcome of litigation that the victim does not.
The victim may then lower her belief about the expected outcome
on the basis of the injurer's low offer. This updating of expectations is ruled out in the optimism model. Not only is a party
unable to affect its rival's beliefs through the offers it makes in
pretrial bargaining, but a party cannot directly reveal information that will influence its rival's opinion about the outcome of
litigation. 0 It is because of this inability to affect anyone else's
belief that the model is called a difference in opinion model, as
opposed to a difference in information model.
This model of differences in opinion rests on fairly weak
theoretical foundations. It is indeed possible that individuals'
opinions may differ. However, we usually attribute the underly-

17 The victim expects to receive (0.9*100,000) less $10,000 in costs, which equals
$80,000.
' The injurer expects to pay (0.5*100,000) plus $10,000 in costs, which equals
$60,000.
" If each was more pessimistic than its counterpart, the agreement zone would be
even larger than if they had the same opinion about the outcome of litigation.
' It may be possible to reveal some of this type of information. The model merely
requires that there be significant residual differences in opinion that cannot be eliminated
through disclosure. It may help to imagine that the model starts after all the possible
disclosure has occurred. For a discussion of the revelation of verifiable information, see
Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner, and Randal Picker, Game Theory and the Law ch 3 (forthcoming, Harvard, 1994).
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ing cause of these differences to differences of information that
others find unconvincing or incomprehensible. Broad experiences
shape the way that a person sees the world, yet it may be very
difficult to convey these experiences in a manner that convinces
others to view the world in a similar fashion. Differences of opinion thus survive.
However, the optimism model is even stricter than this discussion might indicate. The model requires that knowledge of
one's rival's opinion has no effect on one's own opinion. This is a
very strong condition. It may be difficult for someone who has a
unique belief to convey the underlying basis of that belief. We
may want to attribute that belief to a mere difference of opinion.
However, if it is possible for one's rival to convey that his opinion
is honestly held, it may shift one's own beliefs somewhat. The
optimism model does not allow even this.
To make this concept concrete, assume that the parties agree
on the facts, but differ about whether a jury will award punitive
damages. The victim believes that there is a 50% chance of punitive damages being awarded while the injurer believes there is
only a 25% chance. These different beliefs may derive from the
background experiences of each party's lawyer, as well as the
lawyers' unique analyses of the law, beliefs about how juries
decide punitive damage awards, and other, perhaps even more
amorphous, knowledge. These models assume that even if the
victim convinces the injurer that she honestly believes there is a
50% chance of punitive damages, the injurer will not increase his
belief from 25% one iota.21
The alternative model that I analyze in section 5 explicitly
models the differences in belief as based on differences in information. Learning another party's belief, therefore, reveals valuable information and encourages one to update outmoded beliefs.
This somewhat subtle difference can create dramatic differences
in the process of negotiation and settlement. I will also show that
it creates large differences in the characteristics of suits that are
litigated.

2

Consider the following analogous game. You and a friend observe a jar filled with

pennies. You are each asked to write down an estimate of the number of pennies in the
jar. You each then get to see the other's prediction and to revise your initial guess. Changing your prediction indicates that there is a difference in information and the strategic
bargaining issues discussed in the asymmetric information model become important.

Asymmetric Information

III. SELECTION BIAS IN THE OPTIMISM MODEL

In the optimism model, cases are litigated if the difference
between the victim's and the injurer's beliefs about the expected
outcome exceeds total litigation costs; otherwise, the case settles.
The question of selection then boils down to, "how do cases where
the victim is sufficiently optimistic relative to the injurer differ
from randomly selected disputes?" The divergent implications of
different models in the literature derive from the way different
forces lead to a different answer to this basic question.
The Priest and Klein model posits that there is generally
agreement about damages and the differences in opinion are
exclusively about the probability of liability.22 The stakes in the
case are symmetric so the model also assumes away any reputation effects or other reasons why the parties may have differential stakes in the outcome. In addition, each party has information' about the facts of the case. The information is modeled as
a signal that is equal to the underlying facts plus an error term,
where the error term for each party is independently distributed.
Finally, Priest and Klein assume that this error term has a bellshaped distribution.
These assumptions lead to the implication that cases where
the probability of liability is close to 50% are more likely to be
litigated than cases where the probability of a particular side
prevailing is high. Assume that the true facts are far away from
the standard, so that the injurer is very likely to be found liable.
Given the assumption of the bell-shaped distribution of the error
term, it is very unlikely that the difference in the beliefs about
the success of litigation will be large. However, if the true facts
are near the standard, it is much more likely that the parties'
beliefs about the outcome will be large.
It is far from intuitively obvious that the Priest-Klein assumption about error terms is correct.24 Take the example
where damages are $100,000 and each side's litigation costs are
$10,000. In this situation, there will be litigation if the victim's
belief of the probability of a finding of liability exceeds the

Priest and Klein, The Selection ofDisputes for Litigation at 9 (cited in note 2).
2 Priest and Klein refer to the beliefs about the expected outcomes as being based on
information. Id. But given the lack of updating in negotiations, it is more accurate to
describe the differences in beliefs as being based on opinion, not information, in the terminology I adopt.
2
See Donald Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?, 14 J Legal Stud
185 (1985), for an extended discussion of related points.
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injurer's by more than 20%. Priest and Klein assume that it is
more likely that the beliefs will differ by at least this much for
cases where the true probability of a finding of liability is close to
50%. But why should we think that it is more likely that two
parties will have sufficiently different beliefs when the case is
close? Assume that each side forms an opinion about the probability that the victim will prevail, and that the opinion is unbiased, so that it is centered around the true probability. Furthermore, assume that the error in each party's opinion has a bell
shape. Under these assumptions, there is no selection effect like
the one in the Priest and Klein model. Ignoring problems associated with the requirement that probabilities be positive and less
than one, it may be just as likely that the difference in beliefs
will exceed 20% if the probability of success in litigation is far
away from 50%. The Priest and Klein result depends on bellshaped error terms around the true fact pattern rather than
around the probability of prevailing. I see no clear reason to
prefer one assumption to the other.
Much of the subsequent theoretical literature on the selection effect has focused on the necessary conditions for the 50%
rule.2 5 Priest and Klein are fully aware and explicit that the
50% result depends on very strong assumptions that they do not
claim generally hold.26 For example, in addition to clarifying the
strong assumptions on the error terms necessary to generate the
50% result, Wittman studies the selection bias implications of the
decision of whether to file (or not drop) a lawsuit. He shows that
if changes in legal standards affect the incentives to bring (or not
drop) a lawsuit in the first place, the 50% result can be weakened.
IV.

SELECTION BIAS WITH DIFFERENCES OF OPINION AND
STRATEGIC BARGAINING

The optimism model can be modified to allow for strategic
bargaining. In this version of the model, differences in beliefs are
still based on differences in opinion, so bargaining does not cause
either party to update beliefs about the outcome of litigation.

' Id; Donald Wittman, Dispute Resolution, Bargaining,and the Selection of Casesfor
Trial: A Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J Legal Stud 313
(1988).
2 See, in particular, George Priest's reply to Donald Wittman, George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learningfrom Wittman's Mistakes, 14 J Legal Stud 215
(1985).

Asymmetric Information

However, by allowing strategic bargaining, it no longer immediately follows that if the victim's expected gains are less than the
injurer's expected losses there will always be settlement.
Several scholars have analyzed the bargaining process without explicitly considering the information revelation aspects of
bargaining. Mnookin and Kornhauser's classic paper describes
how, in the case of divorce, a simple application of the optimism
model may not be able to explain the pattern of settlement and
litigation." They point out that different valuation of monetary
and non-monetary outcomes such as child custody make settlement more difficult, and that differences in risk aversion, personal feelings, and strategic behavior may play a role.' Although
these issues are important in many settings, I will continue to
focus on settings where the parties care only about monetary
outcomes. I will discuss risk aversion below.
Cooter, Marks, and Mnookin explore the strategic behavior
issues in detail in a subsequent paper.29 They attempt to distinguish between models based on optimism and models based on
strategic behavior. This dichotomy seems flawed to me. I will
argue that the more appropriate distinction is between differences of opinion and differences in information. Consider an environment where there are differences in both opinion and strategic
bargaining, so that the injurer may offer the victim less than his
total expected costs at trial and the victim may demand more
than his net expected recovery. There are two possible scenarios.
First, each party could know the other's opinion. In this situation, posturing in bargaining has limited value and the case is
analogous to the complete information scenario discussed in Section 2 above. The other possibility is that the opinions are private
information. In this case, strategic bargaining may play a role as
the parties pretend that their beliefs are stronger than they actually are.
These effects are undoubtedly important, but it is unclear
how they lead to fundamental differences in selection bias from
the pure optimism model beyond adding noise into the process.
There may be some situations where the agreement range is
positive but strategic posturing prevents the parties from set27 Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the
Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L J 950 (1979).
' Id at 966-72. This point is closely related to my discussion of the difficulties associated with payoffs that depend on more than monetary outcomes, text at note 10.
=' Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks, with Robert Mnookin, Bargainingin the Shadow of
the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J Legal Stud 225 (1982).
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tling. Basically, however, we expect settlements to grow more
likely as the agreement range increases.
Consider the following example. Each party has an opinion of
the outcome of litigation and beliefs about its rival's opinion.
Suppose that each party believes that the expected outcome of
litigation is between $50,000 and $100,000. Assume further that
each value between $50,000 and $100,000 is deemed equally
likely, so that each side's opinion is uniformly distributed between $50,000 and $100,000. Denote the injurer's opinion of the
expected award as X, and the victim's opinion as Xv. Again we
assume that each side must bear litigation costs of $10,000. Measuring everything in thousands of dollars, in the pure difference
of opinion model the parties will litigate if Xv > X1 + 20.
Now consider a very simple model that allows for strategic
bargaining. Assume that the victim gets to make a take-it-orleave-it offer to the injurer. If the injurer rejects the offer, he
cannot make a counteroffer. The parties proceed immediately to
litigation. Although this is a very stylized and unrealistic model
of bargaining, I argue below that it captures the basic effects of
strategic bargaining in this setting.
Call the victim's demand in pretrial bargaining D. The injurer will accept the offer if the settlement payment, D, is less than
the expected costs of litigation, X1 + 10. The probability that D <
X, + 10 is simply (110 - D)/50. The probability that the offer will
be rejected is (D - 60)/50. The expected return to the victim who
has opinion Xv from making an offer of D is the probability it will
be accepted [(110 - D)/50] multiplied by the offer (D) plus the
probability the offer will be rejected [(D - 60)/50] multiplied by
the expected outcome of litigation less litigation costs (Xv - 10),
giving an expected return of [(110 - D)D + (D - 60)(Xv - 10)1/50.
The optimal choice of D can be found by solving for the value of
D which makes the derivative of this expression with respect to
D equal to zero. Differentiating with respect to D gives (110 - 2D
+ Xv - 10), so the optimal choice of D, which we denote D*, is
given by D* = (100 + Xv)/2. The suit will be settled if X, + 10 >
D* or if
X, + 10 > (100 + Xv)/2,
which can be rewritten
X, > (80 + Xv)/2.
The parties will litigate if
Xv> 2X, - 80.
Although this condition differs from the one for the pure optimism model (Xv > X1 + 20), they are qualitatively similar. The

Asymmetric Information

parties litigate more often when they are optimistic about the
outcome of litigation.
This result does not depend on the nature of the bargaining
game. The more optimistic the victim is, the larger the amount
she will demand to settle and the more likely it is that she will
reject a given offer from the injurer. The more optimistic the
injurer is, the smaller the amount he will offer the victim and the
more likely it is that he will reject a given demand by the victim,
All of these forces lead to less settlement among more optimistic

parties.
V. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION MODEL OF LITIGATION AND

PRETRIAL BARGAINING
I will now develop a simple model of pretrial bargaining
based on different beliefs of the parties about the outcome of
litigation, where the differences are based on differences in information rather than on differences in opinion."0 That there are.
differences in information implies that parties will draw inferences about rivals' information that cause them to update their beliefs about the outcome of litigation. This is consistent with much
of the casual evidence about how pretrial negotiation works. The
victim may avoid making an early reasonable demand for fear
that the injurer will infer that if the victim is willing to make
such an offer, the victim's case must not be very strong. This may
cause the injurer to reject the offer. I wish to explore the implications for selection bias of this type of strategic bargaining.
An important element of my analysis is specifying the exact
form of information differences between parties. It seems likely
that a victim may be better informed than the injurer about the
actual damages she incurred, while the injurer may be better
informed than the victim about the care he took or other information that will affect the likelihood of liability. Therefore, I will
assume that the victim has private information about damages
and the injurer has private information about liability. This as-

' There is an extensive literature on pretrial bargaining with private information.
Important examples include Lucian Bebehuk, Litigationand Settlement UnderImperfect Information, 15 Rand J Econ 404 (1984); Barry Nalebuff, Credible PretrialNegotiation, 18
Rand J Econ 198 (1987); Ivan P'ng, Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14
Bell J Econ 539 (1983); Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde, Settlement, Litigation,
and the Allocation of Litigation Costs, 17 Rand J Econ 557 (1986); Urs Schweizer, Litigation and Settlement under Two.Sided Incomplete Information, 56 Rev Econ Stud 163
(1989); Kathryn E. Spier, The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation, 59 Rev Econ Stud 93
(1992).
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sumption about the form of information asymmetry is crucial for
determining the effects of pretrial bargaining on the selection of
suits that are litigated.
In order to keep the analysis simple, I will assume that damages are either high or low, where high damages are $200,000
and low damages are $100,000. I will also assume that the probability of liability is either high or low, where high probability of
liability is 0.75 and low probability of liability is 0.25. The victim
knows whether damages are high or low while the injurer thinks
either is equally likely. Similarly, the injurer knows whether the
likelihood of liability is high or low while the victim thinks either
is equally likely. I continue to assume that each side must bear
litigation costs of $10,000 if they fail to reach an agreement.
I further assume that the private information is
nonverifiable, which means that there is no credible way for
either party to communicate its private information directly. The
victim cannot just say, "damages are $200,000," and expect the
injurer to believe her. In addition, I assume that there is no way
for the victim to produce documents or other evidence that can
convince the injurer of damages. I also assume the analogous restrictions for the injurer's ability to reveal his information to the
victim. This assumption is standard in the literature, although
its application to litigation bargaining is somewhat suspect.3 '
The problem with this assumption is that if the information can
affect the outcome of a trial, there must be some way to introduce it as evidence. It should thus also be possible to reveal the
information to a rival prior to litigation. However, the sanctions
associated with peijury may make it possible to reveal information at trial that cannot be credibly revealed prior to trial. Alternatively, parties may wish to avoid revealing the information
directly because discovering it early can give rivals a strategic
advantage.3 2
Again, in order to keep the analysis simple, I assume a very
simple bargaining game. The victim makes a take-it-or-leave-it
demand of the injurer. If the injurer rejects the offer, litigation
results. I argue below that the implications for selection bias will
be robust enough to survive more complex and realistic assumptions about the way in which bargaining proceeds.

3

See Baird, Gertner, and Picker, Game Theory and the Law at 99-122 (cited in note

20), for a discussion of bargaining where information is verifiable.
32 See id at 106-22 for further discussion of why verifiable information may not be revealed.

Asymmetric Information

Solving this game for the optimal demand by the victim is
considerably more complicated than in the previous model where
there was no private information. Now the injurer may infer
something about the victim's private information on damages
from the victim's demand. For example, if the victim demands
only a little bit of money to settle, the injurer might infer that
damages are lower than he initially thought and that he will
prevail in litigation. The injurer might therefore reject the low
offer. Similarly, if the demand by the victim is high, the injurer
might infer high damages and try to avoid costly litigation. But if
the victim knows what the injurer will infer from the demand,
the low-damage victim will also demand a great deal of money.
Making inferences consistent with optimal actions makes this
scenario even more complicated. We require that the inferences
that the injurer makes are correct and that the victim makes the
optimal demand given the inferences that will be made, both
when damages are high and when damages are low.3
There are two possibilities: either both types of victims are
expected to make the same offer or they are expected to make
different offers. The former is called a pooling equilibrium and
the latter is called a separating equilibrium. First, we will see if
there can be a pooling equilibrium. Again there are two possibilities: either the demand is sufficiently low that both types of injurers will accept, or the offer. is such that only the high probability of liability injurer will accept. Since the high probability of
liability injurer expects to do worse in litigation than a low probability of liability injurer, the high-probability injurer is willing
to pay more to settle the dispute. If only one type of injurer accepts, it probably will be the high-probability injurer.
If both types of injurers accept the offer, it must be the case
that the low-probability injurer will accept. Since we are checking
for a pooling equilibrium, we assume that after the offer is made
the injurer still believes that both low-damage and high-damage
victims are equally likely. The expected cost, again with all numbers in thousands of dollars, if the low-probability injurer rejects
and litigates is the probability of liability equal to 0.25 multiplied
by expected damages of 150, which is 37.5 plus the litigation
' This is a description of some of the conditions for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
More precisely, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a strategy and beliefs for each player at
each point in the game. Each player's actions must be optimal at all points in the game,
given its beliefs and the strategies of the other player. Furthermore, the beliefs must be
updated according to the equilibrium strategies and Bayes' rule. For a more formal discussion see Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists 143 (Princeton, 1992).
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costs of 10 for a total of 47.5. Therefore, for this to be an equilibrium, the demand must be less than or equal to 47.5.
We now check to see if both types of victims are willing to
make a demand of 47.5. Since the high-damage victim does better in litigation than the low-damage victim, it follows that if the
high-damage victim is willing to settle for 47.5, so is the lowdamage victim. The return to the high-damage victim in litigation is 0.5(200) - 10 = 90. Since this is greater than 47.5, we
cannot have a pooling equilibrium where both types of injurers
accept the same offer.
We now check for a pooling equilibrium which attracts only
the high-probability injurer. He will accept if the demand is less
than or equal to 0.75(150) + 10 = 122.5. We need to determine
whether the high-damage victim is willing to settle for 122.5
from the high-probability injurer. If she litigates, she will receive
0.75(200) - 10 = 140, which is greater than 122.5, so there can be
no pooling offer which just the high-probability injurer accepts.
We now look for a separating equilibrium where the highdamage and low-damage victims make different demands. In any
such equilibrium, the injurer can infer damages by the victim's
demand because he expects a different offer from each type of
victim. A high-probability injurer is willing to accept any demand
less than or equal to .75(100) + 10 = 85 from a low-damage victim and any demand less than or equal to .75(200) + 10 = 160
from a high-damage victim. A low-probability injurer is willing to
accept any demand less than or equal to .25(100) + 10 = 35 from
a low-damage victim and any demand less than or equal to
.25(200) + 10 = 60 from a high-damage victim.
If a low-damage victim is known by the injurer to have low
damages, she will wish to make a demand of 85, which only the
high-probability injurer will accept. The victim's expected return
from a demand of 85 is 0.5(85) + 0.5[0.25(100) - 10] = 50 which is
greater than the 35 she gets if she makes an offer which both
types of injurer will accept. The equilibrium in this example is
for the low-damage victim to demand 85 and the high-damage
victim to make no demand, or make a demand so high neither
type of injurer will accept. There can be no separating equilibrium where the high-damage victim makes an offer which is accepted because the low-damage victim would want to mimic that
high offer and "pretend" to have high damages.
Consider what this model has shown. Settlement occurs only
when the victim has low damages and the injurer has a high
probability of being found liable. Litigated cases differ from the
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underlying distribution of disputes in that they are less likely to
be successful than a randomly chosen dispute and damages are
likely to be higher than in a randomly chosen dispute. In the
example, the average damages over all disputes is 150 while the
average damages in litigated case is 167."4 The average probability of liability over all disputes is 0.50 while the average probability of liability in litigated cases is 0.42."
This is the model's important insight. In an environment
where a victim has private information about damages and an
injurer has private information about the likelihood of liability,
low-damage victims and high probability of liability injurers are
more likely to settle. Although this result was derived in a very
special example, it is robust enough to withstand more complicated specifications of the bargaining game and more complicated
distribution assumptions. In any private information bargaining
model, parties with more favorable information about what will
happen if they do not settle, are less likely to settle.36 In the
model, high damages are favorable information for the victim, so
they are less likely to settle. Low-probability of liability is favorable information for the injurer, making them less likely to settle. This is really all one needs to generate the selection effects
that the model describes.
The main difference between my model and the one in the
recent, independent paper by Hylton is the information structure." He assumes that one side has superior information about
liability, so his model is of one-sided asymmetric information
with common knowledge of the level of damages. In much the
same spirit as my argument, he shows that litigation will be
biased toward the innocent privately-informed defendant.38
VI. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS

This description of selection effects provides a sharp contrast
to the 50% result of Priest and Klein. However, one needs to be
careful in predicting its empirical implications. One may be
' If we assume that two-thirds of litigated cases are high-damage victims and onethird are low-damage victims, the expected damages are 2/3(200) + 1/3(100) = 167.
5 If we assume that two-thirds of litigated cases are low probability of liability, the
expected probability of liability of litigated cases is 23(0.25) + 1/3(0.75) = 0.42.
' This idea is very intuitive and applies in other bargaining settings as well. For example, a firm with a large inventory (a form of private information) is more likely to reject a union's offer and trigger a strike than a firm with a low inventory.
Hylton, 22 J Legal Stud 187, 192 (cited in note 4).
Id at 199.
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tempted to say that classes of disputes fitting my informational
assumptions should see a lower probability of success and higher
awards conditional on success, relative to other classes of disputes. But this does not follow because, in contrast to the 50%
result, my results are relative to the underlying distribution of
disputes. Assume that there are two classes of disputes, A and B.
The average Class A suit has an 80% chance of being successful
while the average Class B suit only has a 20% chance of being
successful. Furthermore, assume that the information structure
in Class A disputes conforms to my model while there is no private information in Class B disputes. My model implies that the
success rate in litigated Class A suits will be less than 80%. It
does not imply that the success rate in litigated Class A suits
will be less than the success rate in litigated Class B suits. This
makes the model difficult to test without information about the
underlying merits of disputes in the class.
The one assumption to which the result is sensitive is the
form of private information. In many settings the assumption
that the plaintiff has better information about damages and the
defendant has better information about liability may be entirely
inappropriate. The selection bias may be quite different in such a
setting. Although this may limit the scope of my model, it also
provides an opportunity for testing it. To the extent that one can
make convincing a priori assumptions about how information
asymmetries vary across different disputes or types of disputes,
one may be able to generate testable predictions about settlement
and litigation.
VII. UNCERTAINTY AND SETTLEMENT

In the preceding sections I have highlighted the different
implications of the asymmetric information model and the optimism models for selection bias in litigation. In this section, I will
briefly explore the different implications of the models for another important issue in pre-trial settlement: the role of uncertainty.
Many have argued that the likelihood of settlement decreases as
the amount of uncertainty about the litigation increases.39 There
are numerous implications that one can draw from this assertion.
Since difficult cases are litigated, litigation costs are an overestimate for average cases. The common law may evolve more quick-

" See, for example, Priest, 3 J L Econ & Organization 193, 207 (cited in note 3).
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ly if the process of pre-trial settlement leaves the courts with
mainly the difficult and therefore precedent-setting cases to decide. The preceding sections give us a useful framework for
thinking about whether or not more uncertain cases are indeed
more likely to be litigated.
There are a number of different ways to think of increases in
uncertainty in litigation. One interpretation is that nothing
changes other than the addition of noise to the process of making
legal decisions. This should increase settlement if parties are risk
averse. Although the models discussed in this paper do not include risk aversion, it is straightforward to add risk aversion
without changing the qualitative results. Since trials are risky,
litigants can benefit from avoiding a trial, preferring to settle for
the expected judgment even if litigation is costless. Holding all
else constant, additional uncertainty makes litigation more unattractive and increases the likelihood of settlement.
Thus, if increased uncertainty leads to more litigation it
must be that everything else is not constant. In the optimism
model, increased uncertainty can increase litigation if it increases
differences of opinion about trial outcomes. Consider this effect in
the Priest-Klein setting where there is a known standard and
each party has a signal about where the facts lie relative to the
standard. If increased uncertainty adds noise to the signal, it
follows immediately that litigation will increase. However, people
tend to discuss increased judicial uncertainty in terms of adding
noise to the standard, rather than in terms of adding noise to the
independent signal parties get about how the facts relate to the
standard. There is no reason to think increases in judicial uncertainty should increase the noise in a signal about the fact pattern.
In the Priest and Klein model, making the standard uncertain while keeping the error term of the signal constant has little
or no effect on settlement rates. It is not clear how added uncertainty about a judicial standard would increase differences in
opinion about the outcome of litigation. Perhaps this could occur
if litigants generate different opinions about a court's standard.
This additional noise will lead to optimism about the standard in
addition to optimism about the facts of the underlying dispute.
Either type of optimism could lead to failed pretrial negotiations.
Now briefly consider increased uncertainty in the asymmetric information model. It seems very unlikely that the parties will
obtain private information that improves one side's predictions of
the effect of the increased uncertainty. Instead, adding noise to

94

The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable

[1993:

the process is likely to mitigate the effects of private information.
Suppose, for example, that with some probability the judge just
flips a coin to decide the case. This means the private information will only be valuable when the judge does not flip a coin.
This reduces the effects of the private information and may increase the likelihood of settlement.
This section is designed simply to suggest that the relation
between judicial uncertainty and settlement is far from obvious
on a theoretical level. It certainly does not follow immediately
from either the optimism model or the asymmetric information
model that increases in uncertainty lead to increases in litigation.
Perhaps a different explanation lies in the different incentives of lawyers and their clients to litigate. When there is a
great deal of uncertainty it may be easier for lawyers who wish
to litigate to do so, even if it is against their clients' interests.
Clients will be less able to monitor whether their lawyers are
making correct decisions if there is a great deal of uncertainty.
CONCLUSION

In this paper I contrast the different implications of models
of litigation and pretrial bargaining for selection bias. I demonstrate that there are significant differences between models
based on differences in opinion, such as the optimism model, and
models based on differences in information. If plaintiffs have
better information about damages and defendants have better
information about liability, litigated cases will be less likely to
succeed, but will have higher damages conditional on liability
than the average case in the population. In contrast, the optimism model has no such implication. By characterizing the form
of private information across different types of disputes, the two
models could be tested to determine their relative predictive
values.

